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2 The Importance of Being Earnest 
The green economy and sustainable 
development in China
 
China’s past economic development model has not 
been sustainable, at least in environmental terms. In 
recent years, the Chinese government has dedicated 
considerable time, planning energy, policy and rhetoric 
to “green” issues. However, there is a risk that this 
trend will be stalled by struggles related to pending 
economic problems and the upcoming leadership 
transition. Consequently, the international community 
should acknowledge China’s achievements in terms of 
environmental policy and cooperation as one way of 
serving the global public interest. 
Asia Briefings November 2012
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Opinions about China are mixed, but most 
people would agree that China’s economic 
development over the past 30 years has 
been impressive. Economic development was 
originally triggered by economic reforms 
starting in the late 1970s, and was given 
further impetus in 1992 as leaders officially 
sought to establish a socialist market 
economy. China’s accession to the World 
Trade Organization reaffirmed the value of its 
economic reform strategy, and increased the 
nation’s attractiveness and importance as a 
host for global production. As a result of this 
process, China experienced an average real 
growth rate of 10.1% between 1990 and 2011, 
became the world’s second largest economy, 
and captured a large and growing share of 
global trade that made it the world’s largest 
exporter in 2010. To a significant extent, 
this striking past performance explains 
today’s widespread optimism about China’s 
economic future. 
However, this impressive development 
has carried a serious cost, as the country 
has pursued a strategy prioritizing growth 
over the preservation of natural resources 
throughout most of the last several decades. 
Growth was imperative because it was deemed 
a necessary condition for development 
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and the maintenance of political stability. 
Environmental protection and investments in 
improving resource efficiency seemed likely 
to undermine growth. The results of this 
growth imperative are visible in China’s daily 
urban life in the form of severe air pollution, 
poisoned soils and bad water quality, but are 
also felt globally as a result of China’s high 
absolute levels of greenhouse gas emissions, 
among other issues. China’s CO2 emissions 
are rapidly growing, and will continue to do so, 
if per capita levels follow the German, Japanese 
or U.S. example (see figure 1). In addition, 
energy and resource security have become 
major concerns. The pressure exerted by these 
economic development externalities demands 
a somewhat more pessimistic perspective on 
China’s economic future.
The two aspects of China’s development 
highlight a dilemma. The fast economic 
development of the past was successful in 
raising the incomes and living standards of 
most Chinese, especially those living in the 
urban centers and coastal production hubs. 
China’s average per capita income has today 
reached the lower-middle-income country 
level. Chinese citizens clearly aspire to more, 
and hope that future economic development 
will continue to raise incomes and living 
standards. But what if past development 
was not only accompanied by low wages, 
extensive use of resources and degradation 
of the natural environment? What if China’s 
economic success actually relied on low wages, 
low environmental and social standards, and 
extensive resource use? This raises questions 
as to the essence of the Chinese economic 
development model and whether the model 
can be maintained – and if the answer is no, 
whether it can be practically changed. 
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Figure 1: CO2 per capita emissions in tons (2002–2010)
Source: OECD/IEA Enery Balances of Non-OECD Countries (2012 edition)
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China’s policies for 
enhancing environmental 
sustainability
The Chinese government is well aware 
of this dilemma, and has in recent years 
gradually put numerous environmental 
policies into place. 
However, implementation has represented 
a major weakness in these policies. While 
legislation at the central level has made 
considerable progress, implementation at the 
local level has been rather weak. Examples 
like the following are common: In 2009, the 
Ministry of Environment halted dam projects 
already under construction because they had 
been begun by local governments without 
obtaining the required environmental approval. 
In 2010, the final year of the 11th Five Year Plan, 
the central government was forced to realize 
that local governments had widely ignored the 
plan’s energy intensity targets. 
The Chinese system of cadre promotion 
has long been blamed for this weak record 
of environmental policy implementation. 
Cadre promotion is based on an evaluation 
of achievements, among other factors. This 
formalized evaluation attaches great importance 
to economic growth within a candidate’s local 
constituency, both directly, as GDP growth rates 
are taken as a proxy for a locality’s economic 
growth, and indirectly, in that employment 
rates and social stability tend to reflect a 
region’s growth. This latter point is taken quite 
seriously, as the failure to ensure local stability 
could result in serious problems for the political 
system as a whole. Thus, maintaining social 
stability is arguably even more important for 
cadre promotion than growth per se. However, 
economic growth is usually viewed as the best 
way to preserve social stability. A consequence 
of this system is that local governments and 
cadres have been reluctant to implement social 
and environmental policies deemed likely to 
slow growth.
The cadre system gains even more 
importance against the background of constant 
regional rivalry. Local governments strive to 
attract investment, especially foreign direct 
investment, as this has been an important 
factor in driving local growth, employment and 
prestige. The economic reforms implemented 
in China since the 1980s have given local 
governments new rights to approve investment 
decisions. At the same time, the central 
government has encouraged local governments 
to compete with each other. To a certain 
extent, this has created incentives for a race 
to the bottom in terms of social, labor and 
environmental standards. 
However, while the cadre promotion system 
is important as one explanation of weak 
implementation, blaming it alone distracts from 
the core underlying dilemma: Environmental 
policies do in fact tend to increase the 
immediate costs of production, as they aim 
at internalizing previously externalized 
production costs. As such, environmental 
policies present a challenge to the past Chinese 
development model, which to a large extent 
relied on extremely low production costs. The 
level of decentralization within the Chinese 
system supports the impression that the 
central government was serious in its efforts 
to propagate environmental policies, while the 
local governments failed in implementation. 
A more accurate estimation of the situation 
suggests that the central government simply 
left the problematic aspects of balancing growth 
and sustainability to the local governments in 
the course of policy implementation.
Translating sustainability 
concerns into drivers of 
growth
In responding to the core growth-
sustainability dilemma, recent Chinese 
policy concepts have gone beyond mere 
environmental protection. During the first 
decade of the new century, the Chinese 
government developed the idea of translating 
sustainability concerns into drivers of growth. 
Since 2003, the official formulation for this has 
been a “scientific approach to development.” 
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The goal here is to strive for a development 
model driven by knowledge, science and 
technology, while at the same time stressing 
environmental sustainability, energy security 
and energy efficiency. The activities associated 
with this model would be used to establish new 
core national competencies and competitive 
advantages. This developmental vision implies 
that China can create a substitute for its 
previous growth model, which was based on 
labor-intensive export-oriented production. This 
switch would – allegedly – allow China to cut the 
unsustainable levels of resource consumption 
that threaten its natural resource base.
The most recent shift in China’s 
environmental policies has entailed a new 
focus on climate change mitigation. The 
country’s policies on this issue gained 
global attention in the run-up to the 2009 
Copenhagen climate summit. By this time, 
strong voices in China had begun to argue 
that the country should strive for leadership 
in the climate change mitigation field as a 
basis for future development and international 
influence. While this did not initially represent 
mainstream opinion in Chinese political 
circles, a consensus eventually emerged that 
the global interest in low-carbon development 
models provided China with an opportunity. 
Low-carbon technologies, green growth and 
similar concepts seemed to be important for 
future development and competitiveness, 
especially as green growth targets promised to 
show strong overlap with policy targets related 
to energy security. The latter goals are deemed 
essential within China; achieving green growth 
in a way that contributed to energy security 
thus held considerable appeal. 
Under this perspective, environmental 
sustainability and low-carbon policies ceased to 
be viewed simply as costly targets endangering 
development, but rather represented a means 
of promoting international competitiveness 
and long-term development. Consequently, 
the current 12th Five Year Plan (2011-2015) 
strongly emphasizes this new growth model. 
The timeliness of this perspective was 
confirmed when many industrialized countries 
also stressed the importance of green sectors 
and technologies in their efforts to overcome 
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Figure 2: Electricity generation in China, by energy source (2009–2010)
Source: OECD/IEA Enery Balances of Non-OECD Countries (2012 edition)
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the global financial crisis. Since that time, a 
global “green race” has emerged, influencing, 
for example, discussion worldwide in the run-
up to the Rio+20 summit earlier in 2012.
In concrete terms, this new development 
concept has resulted in quick policy adjustments 
in China. To highlight just one example, the 
central government has augmented its targets 
for climate change mitigation efforts and 
renewable energy deployment (particularly 
wind and solar) several times over a rather 
short period (see table 1). The development 
of new and renewable energy sources has 
become a strategic issue, supported by 
dedicated industrial policies. The use of 
renewable energies for electricity generation 
roughly doubled from 2009 to 2010, which is 
quite impressive. However, this increase was 
outpaced in absolute terms by increases in the 
use of coal and hydroelectricity (see figure 2). 
Comparable attention has further been devoted 
to other sectors and technologies related to 
environmental sustainability, green growth 
and low-carbon development, with electric cars 
being just one prominent example.
The new policies have changed the 
attitude of local governments. Because the 
central government is emphasizing this new 
development concept clearly, supporting it 
with significant funding, local competition in 
the area has emerged. Cities dedicated to low-
carbon development, electric mobility and 
other experiments have been identified and 
encouraged to compete for solutions. Overall, 
an impression has been created that the new 
paradigm eliminates any implied contradiction 
between environmental policy goals and 
development, allowing instead for development 
driven by competitiveness in the green 
technology sector. Naturally this has helped to 
trigger implementation of environmental goals 
at the local level. 
Today, however, the policies supporting the 
“green race” face challenges associated with 
rapid implementation, rather than with the 
slow movement of previous years. Renewable 
energy deployment, especially in the case 
of wind energy, has overtaken the current 
electricity grid’s capability to manage inputs. 
Some low-carbon cities have invested in 
projects that appear green but have not in fact 
contributed to decreasing carbon footprints. 
The solar photovoltaic cell manufacturing 
industry faces serious overcapacity problems, 
while other projects such as support for 
electric vehicle technology have consumed 
significant quantities of central and local 
government funding without producing the 
hoped-for technological leap forward. In sum, 
the strategies and policies implemented to 
date have not produced the intended results, 
even though local governments have at least 
nominally followed their spirit.
In this context, the current economic 
and political situation carries serious risks. 
China’s economic growth rates are declining. 
While this decline remains within the 
predicted range, lower growth rates have 
led to serious financial difficulties for some 
local governments and financial institutions. 
The economic development path of the past 
10 years turns out to have relied not only on 
low wages and export-oriented production, 
but also on cycles of significant government-
supported investment and a policy bias toward 
state-owned and state-backed companies. 
Central and local governments have each 
played an active role in steering China’s 
economy, influencing investment choices and 
manipulating competition.
In the current situation, with growth 
prospects weak and a central leadership 
transition underway, the Chinese government’s 
strong role within the economy has come 
under considerable criticism. Many economists 
have called for reforms that would put China 
back on a path of reform and liberalization. The 
political priorities of the future government 
elite are not yet clear. However, it is likely 
that the new central government will opt for 
a more liberal approach, enacting policies 
encouraging the private sector while limiting 
government intervention.
Ironically, this perspective leaves 
considerable uncertainty as to the future of 
China’s “green” development. Will the new 
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Table 1: Overview of China’s climate change and renewable energy (RE) policy goals
Year
International 
commitments
National policies and major targets
Policies
Selected general 
targets
Wind and solar 
energy targets
1995
Development Plan for 
New and Renewable 
Energies (1996–2010)
2000 RE use: 298 Mtce*
2010 RE use: 390 Mtce*
2010:
Wind: 1.2 GW
Solar: no explicit targets
2001 10th FYP (2001–2005)
2005: New and RE use: 
13 Mtce**
2005:
Wind: 1.2GW
Solar: 53 MW
2002
China approves 
Kyoto Protocol; 
no commitment 
for action as China is 
not Annex I party
2007
Long- and medium-
term development plan 
for renewable energies
Share of RE in total 
energy consumption:
2010: 10%
2020: 15%
2010:
Wind (on-grid): 5GW
Solar: 300 MW
2020:
Wind: 30 GW
Solar: 1.8 GW
2008
11th FYP for new and 
renewable energies 
(2006–2010)
2010:
Share of RE in total 
energy consumption: 
10% Total RE use: 
300 Mtce
2010:
Wind (on-grid): 10GW
Solar: 300 MW
2010
China announces 
autonomous domestic 
action to UNFCCC 
under the Copenhagen 
Climate Accord 
(January)
Reduce carbon dioxide 
emissions per unit of 
GDP by 40%-45% by 
2020 compared to the 
2005 level, increase 
the share of non-fossil 
fuels in primary energy 
consumption to around 
15% by 2020
2010/ 
2011
Spring 2010: Decision 
to include autonomous 
domestic mitigation 
targets into 12th FYP 
(2011–2015)
Share of non-fossil 
fuels in primary energy 
consumption: 
2015: 12%-13% 
2020: 20%
2020:
Wind: 150 GW
Solar: 20–30 GW
Mtce: million tons of coal equivalents
* includes traditional use of biomass 
** excludes small hydro and traditional use of biomass
Sources: Authors’ compilation based on Chinese government documents
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Chinese government continue to follow the 
“scientific approach to development”? And 
if so, will it be able to pursue this Chinese 
concept of “green growth” using a new array 
of policy instruments? Will it be possible 
to increase environmental regulation while 
simultaneously reducing the state’s active 
economic involvement? Will local governments 
be willing to bet on green technologies if they 
are forced to be more prudent in terms of 
government investment and local budgetary 
expenditures? Will the Chinese government 
be able to create green industrial policies 
that promote technological development and 
innovation without catering to the interests of 
state-backed companies?
A global dilemma
These questions clearly link China’s political 
choices to the overarching questions of global 
sustainable development. How much does 
economic development depend on resource 
depletion and environmental deterioration? 
How much does economic growth depend on 
government spending (and consequently on the 
accumulation of government debt)? And how 
much are these two questions related? High 
hopes are currently accorded to the concept 
of “green growth” as a means to bridge what 
might otherwise be seen as a tension between 
green policy targets and growth expectations. 
But green growth’s ability to cut our resource 
and carbon footprint in a substantive way 
remains unclear.
As a global community, we face these global 
challenges and questions together. However, 
more so than other countries, China has been 
the target of criticism for its environmental 
problems and reluctance to engage in climate 
change mitigation. The strong economic role 
played by China’s government has also been 
a target of censure. Pledges to engage in 
further reforms and liberalization are clearly 
intended to support economic growth, both 
in China and at the global level. However, the 
world community should be honest: Though it 
wants China to accelerate its reforms and its 
process of liberalization, and simultaneously 
expects China to develop in a sustainable 
and low-carbon way, it is unclear how this 
can be realized. If China were to hit upon a 
growth model that eliminates the core growth-
sustainability dilemma described above, it 
could also serve as a new growth model for the 
rest of the world. However, China, like the rest 
of us, is still searching. Under these conditions, 
the West must treat its cooperation with 
China quite earnestly. It should identify and 
support groups and individuals in China that 
advocate a focus on low-carbon development 
and sustainability alongside growth. Western 
countries should actively support cooperation 
between figures in the science, education and 
business worlds who are seeking solutions 
to the core dilemma. And above all, Western 
countries should not lecture the Chinese 
as if they themselves had already hit upon 
solutions to the core growth dilemma that were 
exportable with equal facility to industrialized, 
emerging and developing countries.
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